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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The banking industry has experienced major changes in recent times due to the 
impact of deregulation, advances in information systems and technologies, 
globalization, and more recently the global financial crisis triggered by the subprime 
turmoil in the United States (Kahveci & Sayilgan 2006; Lapavitsas & Santos 2008; 
Wignall & Atkinson 2010; World Bank 2005). Businesses that were regarded in the 
past as profitable and safe have come to be seen as uneconomical and reckless (Erturk 
& Solari 2007; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009). The speed and intensity with which 
the banking industry has changed, has led to phenomenal growth in international 
transactions, expansion of banking operations across borders, and the restructuring 
and consolidation of banks. Such growth in turn has prompted banks to seek new 
sources of income, use complex tools for risk assessment and mitigation, and have 
greater awareness of their costs and the productivity gains to be realised from work 
reorganisation and financial innovations (Bank for International Settlements 2006; 
Helliar, Cobb & Innes 2002; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009). Accordingly, in 
addition to the traditional banking products, banks have become more involved in 
volatile investment activities and financial instruments such as junk bonds, leveraged 
buyouts, commercial papers, mutual funds, derivatives and assets securitisation 
(Citigroup Annual Report 2000; Frei, Harker & Hunter 1998; World Bank 2008).  
Banks have increasingly become subject to immense pressure from their 
stakeholders to improve performance, forcing them to re-examine their traditional 
management control approaches and technologies, strengthen their capital base, 
reduce their non-performing and toxic assets, bring down operational costs, enhance 
corporate governance and sharpen their customer centric initiatives (Frei et al. 1998; 
Helliar et al. 2002; Lapavitsas & Santos 2008). Moreover, the recent financial crisis 
which started in mid-2007 has forced banking institutions worldwide to grapple with 
reduced public confidence, heightened shareholder scrutiny and increased regulatory 
insight (Wignall & Atkinson 2010). Additionally, the introduction of risk-adjusted 
performance measurement guidelines by the Bank for International Settlements, the 
Basel Accords2 and stringent supervisory control frameworks such as CAMELS3 and 
CAEL4, have resulted in the significant transformation of banks in respect to 
organisational structures, systems and strategies (Geyfman 2005; World Bank 2005).  
In an attempt to support such changes, many banks have adopted 
technologically sound and sophisticated management practices (Bank of England 
2003). The adoption of new technologies and management practices have led to 
concerns in regards to the suitability of their existing control systems, including 
                                                 
2 Basel Accord I was released in 1988 which was later replaced with Basel Accord II in 2004. The 
Basel Accord II rested on three pillars: minimum capital requirements (pillar 1), guidelines on 
regulatory intervention to national supervisors (pillar 2) and new information disclosure standards for 
banks (pillar 3). In a response to the global financial crisis the Basel Committee has drafted Basel 
Accord III to replace Basel Accord II from 2012. 
3 The CAMELS framework involves analysis of specific groups of performance measures namely 
Capital adequacy, Assets quality, Management, Earning quality, Liquidity and Sensitivity (market 
risk). 
4 The CAEL framework involves analysis of four groups of performance measures namely Capital 
adequacy, Assets quality, Earnings and Liquidity.  
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performance measurement systems (PMSs)5. In particular, there is an increasing need 
to introduce changes to PMSs in order to develop and adopt innovative and robust 
solutions for management controls, new databases and new analytical ways to 
prudently assess costs, benefits and risks (Guerreiro, Alberto & Frezatti 2006; 
Hawkins & Mihaljek 2001; Karr 1997; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009). Banks are 
also being encouraged to adopt management accounting tools, such as activity-based 
management, customer profitability analysis, target costing, benchmarking, value 
based management and integrated PMSs6 (Frei et al. 1998; Helliar et al. 2002; 
Khiaonarong & Liebena 2009; Kimball 1997).  
It has become evident that in order to meet the challenges of the changing 
organisational environment, management control systems, within which PMS is a 
part, should be adjusted before they lose their relevance  (Eccles 1991; Ferreira & 
Otley 2009; Ittner & Larcker 1998; Kaplan 1984; Modell 2007). A primary difference 
between banks that succeed and those that fail is the ability to respond to the pace of 
change7 to scan and monitor their external environment, and to anticipate and adapt 
timely to continual change (Tanner 2009). Alternatively, the inability of banks to 
recognize the need for change and their fragile adaptation ability could contribute to a 
decline in their performance (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga 2000; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009). Hence, it is important that PMSs adapt to the recent 
environmental conditions as reflected in the following comments by Dixon, Nanni & 
Vollmann:  
 
A good measurement system needs to be continually changed in order to 
remain effective. As one set of goals or objectives is satisfied, or as the set 
of measures becomes too gross to detect improvement, a new set need to 
be articulated, and the old set needs to be discarded or modified. This 
means there can never be a set of good performance measurement that is 
stable over time. (1990, p4-5): 
However, it seems that the link betwen the changes in the organisational 
environment and changes in PMSs is not a simple linear process. Specifically, 
organisations often prefer to maintain the status quo and are reluctant to implement 
required changes without a certain degree of coercion. Furthermore, even after a 
                                                 
5 In the management accounting literature there are various interpretations and explanations of the 
concept of PMS. Kaplan (1984), for instance, described a PMS as an information system that aims to 
provide financial signals in order to help management make decisions. In a similar vein, Marshall et al. 
(1999) describe a PMS as a development of indicators and collection of data to describe, report and 
analyse performance. Neely, Gregory and Platts (1995) considered a PMS as a process of quantifying 
both the efficiency and effectiveness of actions. Recently, in a more comprehensive perspective, 
Simons (2000) defined a PMS as formal information based routines and procedures that managers use 
to maintain or alter patterns in organisational activities.  
6 Examples of these systems are the Performance Measurement Matrix (Keegan, Eiler & Jones 1989), 
SMART Pyramid (Lynch & Cross 1991), Result and Determinants Framework (Fitzgerald et al. 1991), 
Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton 1992), Performance Prism (Neely, Adams & Kennerley 2002) 
and Comparative Business Scorecard (Kanji & Moura 2002). 
7 The research on organisational change regards change as a continuous, unpredictable process driven 
by environmental instability that organisations try to overcome through different modifications and 
adaptations (Burns & Vaivio 2001).  
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decision is made to introduce change, rather than passively accepting the change, 
organisational members may respond to such decisions in different ways. 
Accordingly, an awareness of the factors influencing changes in PMSs, the forms of 
pressure that enact change, and the way in which organisations respond to change 
efforts is required to fully understand changes in PMSs within banks.  
While existing studies on changes in PMSs in banks address various issues 
in relation to changes, such as the process of change, its nature and outcome, they do 
not explicitly present a framework to analyse the factors that influence such change or 
consequential responses to such change attempts. A number of studies have 
developed analytical frameworks to examine similar issues (e.g.  Kasurinen 2002; 
Burns & Scapens 2000; Waggoner, Neely & Kennerley 1999; Greenwood & Hinings 
1996; Innes & Mitchell 1990) in manufacturing organisations, but their applicability 
to banks is limited due to management and operational specificities that are different 
from manufacturing organisations. Additionally, these frameworks suffer from a 
number of shortcomings. For instance, Burns & Scapens (2000), Greenwood & 
Hinings (1996) and Kasurinen (2002) state that many of the frameworks used to 
examine management accounting change do not help to explain complexities of the 
change process, and have failed to provide a holistic analysis of the macro-level 
context of an organisation as well as its institutional context. Further, managerial 
responses to the institutional pressures influencing change have generally not been 
addressed in these frameworks. Accordingly, the main motivation of this paper is to 
develop an analytical framework to examine changes in PMSs with a specific focus 
on the factors influencing the change and the responses to change efforts within the 
context of the banking industry. The paper draws on institutional theory, more 
specifically DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) notion of institutional isomorphism, and 
Oliver’s (1991) typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an 
outline of the theoretical underpinning of the framework developed in this paper. 
Section 3 then discusses the environmental factors that affect the functioning of 
banks. The institutional pressures that could influence changes in PMSs are discussed 
in Section 4, followed by a discussion of the strategic responses to institutional 
pressures in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides a summary of the paper and some 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING 
 
Institutional theory has evolved into a body of literature encompassing multiple levels 
of analysis concerning change in organisations. It deals with how organisations are 
affected by forces which lie beyond its control (Hoffman 1999) and is built on the 
notion that institutional environments are socially constructed (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983). Accordingly, the institutional environment and its participants play key roles 
in shaping organisational systems, structures and behaviours. Scott (1998, p12) 
explains that:  
every organisation exists in a specific physical, technological, cultural 
and social environment to which it must adapt.  No organisation is self-
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sufficient, all depend for survival on types of relations they establish with 
larger systems of which they are a part.  
 From this perspective, an organisation must comply with environmental 
changes if it is to receive legitimacy and continued societal support. Thus, the 
institutional environment is viewed as defining not only the appropriate 
organisational systems, structures and behaviours but also the manner in which they 
conform to institutionalised beliefs in society. While institutions are an integral part 
of organisational life, institutional theory treats institutions as largely exogenous to 
the organisation. Institutional theorists suggest that institutional theory can be applied 
to a variety of different organisations and many different levels of analysis, stretching 
from a macro-system perspective to an organisational sub-system perspective (Scott 
2001). These levels are connected within an organisational field. DiMaggio & Powell 
(1983) introduced the concept of organisational fields to analyse the context of an 
organisation which includes closely related suppliers, customers, regulators, 
competitors or other important inter-organisational links which are important 
determinants of institutional pressures. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) further emphasise 
that the impact of institutional pressure is dependent on the position of a particular 
organisation within an organisational field. Over time, organisational fields are 
subject to change (Greenwood & Hinings 1996). 
The mechanisms through which organisations adopt systems and procedures 
is termed institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Isomorphism is “a 
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p149). 
They identify three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphism occurs, 
each with its own antecedents - coercive, mimetic and normative. “Coercive 
isomorphism” is the response to:  
both formal and informal pressures exerted on organisations by other 
organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural 
expectations in the society within which organisation functions 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p150).  
Organisations are forced to change their systems and procedures directly as a 
consequence of changing legislation. This adherence to pressure helps the 
organisation to secure economic resources and legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1991). 
“Mimetic isomorphism” is the act of copying other organisations when organisations 
face uncertainty, and the way in which they “model themselves on other 
organisations” in order to overcome uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p151). In 
particular, ambiguous organisational goals and strategies or poorly understood 
technologies may cause organisations to model themselves on other organisations. 
Scapens (1994) argues that mimetic behaviour has a conformity element, wherein 
organisations adopt contemporary practices to legitimise their structures, systems and 
processes by appearing to be in control. “Normative isomorphism” is associated with 
professionalisation (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p152), and arises when professionals 
operating in organisations are subject to pressures to conform to a set of norms, 
values and rules developed by occupational and professional bodies (Abernethy & 
Chua 1996). In this form of isomorphism, organisations feel obliged to adopt 
structures, systems and processes that have been advocated by dominant occupational 
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and professional groups (Burns 2000). Informed by DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) 
notion of institutional isomorphism, this paper argues that banks may introduce 
change to their PMSs as a result of these three forms of pressure.  
 
Figure 1 
Analytical Framework for examining changes in performance measurement systems within the 
banking sector 
 
 
 
 However, DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) notion of institutional isomorphism 
does not address the possible organisational responses to change efforts (Oliver 1991) 
and the strategic behaviours associated with the consequential change (Covaleski & 
Dirsmith 1988). There have been calls advocating the extension of DiMaggio & 
Powell’s (1983) notion of institutional isomorphism to include responses to the 
institutional pressures to analyse change (Greenwood & Hinings 1996). Oliver (1991) 
discusses the various strategies organisations appear to adopt in response to 
institutional pressures to change. While questioning the notion of institutional 
determinism, she argues that organisations respond to different environments by 
pushing them in differing directions due to diverse norms and expectations. 
Accordingly, conforming to institutional pressures is not an exclusive   option, even if 
it might be tempting in order to gain legitimacy. The possibility of achieving gains 
through resistance is also argued to exist. Thus, it is argued that an organisation 
makes an active response to institutional pressures with the extreme option being to 
either conform or resist. Oliver (1991) presented a continuum of strategic responses 
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with five types of responses (acquiescence, compromise, avoid, defy, and 
manipulate)8. 
Hence, the framework developed in this paper to examine changes in PMSs in 
banks draws from both DiMaggio & Powell (1983) and Oliver (1991). The proposed 
framework is depicted in Figure 1. The framework identifies a number of macro-level 
factors that affect the functioning of banks and the resulting institutional pressures 
which could lead to changes in their PMSs. The paper also recognises the influence of 
strategic responses when introducing change with the direction, nature and outcome 
of change efforts likely to be determined by the responses of the key organisational 
actors. Environmental factors that could have an impact on PMSs, and the 
institutional pressures that could lead to changes in PMS are discussed respectively in 
Sections 3 and 4, with the strategic responses of organisations to such changes 
discussed in Section 5.  
 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE FUNCTIONING OF BANKS 
 
The literature suggests that changes in PMSs are influenced mainly by the macro- 
level environment of banks (Hussain & Hoque 2002) with the resulting changes 
improving not only the quality of information, thereby leading to increased 
productivity and accountability (Perera 2004), but also the ability to survive in a 
highly competitive environment (Cobb, Helliar & Innes 1995; Helliar et al. 2002). 
Hussain & Hoque (2002) suggest that changes in the macro-level environment could 
influence changes in the strategy and/or structure of banks, which in turn could lead 
to changes in management control systems, including performance measurement 
practices. The macro-level environment is an outer realm of banks which is outside 
their control. Innovations in management philosophies, trade liberalisation, new 
technologies, increased competition, changes in regulatory frameworks, and uncertain 
economic and political conditions have often been cited in the banking literature as 
major factors that influence the functioning of banks (Helliar et al. 2002). This study 
combines these macro-level factors into three categories, namely economic 
conditions, technological innovations, and socio-cultural and political environment.  
 
Economic Conditions 
 
In recent years banks have faced an uncertain economic climate because of 
macroeconomic factors such as globalisation, liberalised deregulation, privatisation, 
and highly fluctuating, at times unpredictable, inflation and interest rates (Harker & 
Zenios 1998; Helliar et al. 2002; World Bank 2009). Such economic conditions place 
pressure on banks to improve performance (Burney 1999; Williams & Seaman 2002), 
and one area that could be used for that purpose is the PMS. Performance could be 
improved by using existing measurement and control systems more efficiently or by 
introducing new systems for that purpose (Brignall & Modell 2000; Hussain & Hoque 
2002). For instance, the recent global financial crisis which started in 2007 has forced 
many banks to strengthen their PMS and internal management controls by integrating 
strategic planning, risk measurement and mitigation frameworks, and performance 
                                                 
8 Explanation of these responses is provided in Section 5. 
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reporting systems in order to enable each business area to monitor its contribution, 
and deliver clearer, relevant and more consistent financial information (Bank of 
England 2008, p27-30).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that volatile market conditions 
(e.g. fluctuations in interest rates, foreign exchange rates and equity prices) generate 
high risk for banks and threaten their earnings, capital, liquidity, and solvency. 
Effective risk management within banks demands accurate and timely risk 
quantification which can be assisted by an efficient PMS9 (Bank of England 2008). 
Therefore, banks need more formal, detailed PMSs that not only establish stringent 
internal controls but facilitate prudent analysis that captures all activities which 
expose banks to risk and then measures the specific risks presented.  
Banking was traditionally a highly protected industry with restrictions on 
domestic and foreign entry. However, progressively liberalised deregulation, both 
within countries and across national boundaries, has led to cut-throat competition 
between banks and other financial institutions (Hawkins & Mihaljek 2001). For 
example, GE Capital, the financial services subsidiary of General Electric and Tesco, 
offers financial services including credit cards, loans and insurance. As in other 
industries, the degree of competition in the banking sector is primarily driven by the 
need to create efficiency in financial services, the quality of financial products and the 
degree of innovation in the sector (Frei et al. 1998; Oberman 2006). In the face of 
these objectives banks are attempting to redefine their businesses. The traditional 
financial intermediation role of banks to provide loans and mobilise deposits has 
become a relatively less important part of the overall business, as banks are 
diversifying into a wider range of services (Lapavitsas & Santos 2008). Further, 
Claessens & Laeven (2003) and Hawkins & Mihaljek (2001) note that one of the 
catalysts for increased competition is the removal of ceilings on deposits rates. This 
deregulation measure has reduced sources of cheap funding for many banks and put 
pressure on their profits, thereby forcing them to price risks more realistically and to 
charge explicitly for previously free services (Berger 2003; Hawkins & Mihaljek 
2001). The increased competition in the banking sector has not only facilitated the 
access of organisations and individuals to financial services and financing, but also 
eroded the market share of many banks. Consequently a substantial number of banks 
are entering into high risk ventures making it vital for banks to apply integrated PMSs 
and apply appropriate internal controls for different activities (Bank for International 
Settlements 2009). 
The easing of restrictions on entry of foreign banks and the search for global 
markets for profit opportunities have led to a growing presence of foreign-owned 
banks in domestic markets in many countries (Gormley 2007; World Bank 2005, 
2006). As a result, banks now increasingly look for sophisticated management tools 
to exploit new businesses. Foreign banks have introduced a range of procedures, 
technologies and experience that focus on credit, automated credit scoring, mass 
distribution channels and electronic lending platforms, such as credit card networks 
(World Bank 2006). They have been able to successfully compete against socially 
and culturally embedded domestic banks, partly due to their usage of superior 
technology and customer service (Lapavitsas & Santos 2008; Hitt & Frei 2002). 
                                                 
9 See for details: Operational Risk Management, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1998) and 
Risk Management in the New Regulatory Environment, Gartner Inc., (2003). 
Munir , Perera & Baird: An Analytical Framework to Examine Changes 
101 
 
Notable examples of such banks include Citibank, Hong Kong Shanghai Banking 
Corporation and Standard Chartered Bank. These conditions in the economic 
environment suggest that the success, or even long term survival of a bank would 
depend upon the appropriate utilisation of resources as well as their control over the 
costs and quality of services.  
The need for more comprehensive PMSs to assist organisations to operate 
effectively in today’s competitive environment has often been emphasised by 
accounting academics and practitioners (Ferreira & Otley 2009; Chenhall & Euska 
2007; Sulaiman & Mitchell 2005). A number of recent studies have also concluded 
that traditional PMSs are inappropriate given today’s complex economic conditions, 
with such factors considered to be an influential factor in regard to the changes in 
PMSs in banks.  
 
Technological Innovations 
 
The impact of technology on management accounting practices including 
performance measurement practices has been well recognized in the management 
accounting literature (e.g. Johnson & Kaplan 1987; Otley 1994). The literature 
suggests that the innovations in technology has contributed significantly to the 
expansion of the banking industry (Kimball 1997), with Kaplan & Norton (1996) 
arguing that the impact of information technology is even more revolutionary for 
service than manufacturing organisations.  
Technological innovations play a pivotal role in the performance of banks. 
Technology provides an opportunity for banks to improve service performance in 
addition to providing a broader range of financial products and services. The 
literature on banking reveals that over the last two decades there has been a 
phenomenal increase in the offer of e-banking or e-finance products and services by 
banks, such as internet banking, debit cards, e-bill payments, smart cards and stored-
value cards, in order to stay competitive (Allen, McAndrews & Strahan 2002). These 
advancements have allowed banks to innovate customer service and delivery 
channels, not only to fulfil the needs of customers, but also to achieve economies of 
scale and to increase competitiveness (Hitt & Frei 2002). Consequently, banks have 
increasingly started focusing on  customer and product profitability analysis as key 
performance measures thereby requiring them to create existing and potential 
customers’ profiles which become important to the decisions to lend, mobilise 
deposits and track movement of customers’ accounts (Helliar et al. 2002; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009).   
Additionally, transactions between banks and their depositors have mostly 
become automated, the role of bank branches has been significantly changed, the 
techniques of funds transmission have been altered, and new ways of managing 
accounts and making payments have emerged. Banking literature suggests that 
automation of transactions and the associated developments have radically changed 
the operational structure of banks and have contributed to steadily rising Automated 
Teller Machine (ATM) numbers, online transactions, and increased pressure on banks 
to expand investments in complex information technology infrastructures (Berger 
2003). While these changes have created new fields of profitability for banks, the 
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changes have also significantly enhanced risks for banks due to the enhanced volume 
of business activities and increased flow of information (Bank for International 
Settlements 2006). Against these trend, anecdotal evidence suggests, that many banks 
have been forced to adopt new types of performance measures, such as number of 
customers per ATM, number of transactions per ATM, number of faulty transactions, 
and number of ATM breakdowns, in order to foster control over business activities.  
 
Socio-cultural and Political Environment 
 
The socio-cultural and political environment is generally characterised by the rules 
and requirements to which individual organisations must conform if they are to gain 
support and legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Scott (2001) suggests that 
political pressures generally result from changes in the interests of individuals or 
groups, and underlying power distributions that provide support for the existing 
institutional environment. Socio-cultural pressure is associated with differentiation of 
groups and the existence of heterogeneous or divergent beliefs and practices. The 
presence of these pressures undermines the stability of organisation, hence resulting 
in the gradual abandonment of a set of management practices within an organisation 
(Stark 1996). For example, in many Islamic countries, banks have been forced to 
introduce “profit and loss based or interest free” banking products, abandoning the 
“interest based” products to satisfy the fundamental belief (faith) of Islamic societies 
which prohibit charging interest (Ahmad 1993). Consequently, central banks in many 
Islamic countries have issued a separate set of prudential regulations for Islamic 
banking activities.  
Alam (1997), Hoque & Hopper (1994), and Hussain & Gunasekaran (2002), 
among others, have identified a number of social and political factors which have 
forced changes in organisational structure and strategy such as political instability, 
resource scarcity and coalition amongst organisations. Within the banking literature it 
is argued that banks voluntarily, or some times obligatorily, follow international 
organisational standards/quality measurement stipulations determined by institutions, 
such as the Bank for International Settlements, International Standards Organisation 
(ISO) and the United Nations Organisation (UNO), and consequently adapt their 
performance measures to conform to the recommendation of such bodies (Holland, 
Lockett & Blackman 1997). For instance, the Bank for International Settlements has 
made it obligatory for the banks operating in developing countries to adopt 
performance measures and internal control standards set under Basel Accords if they 
intend to operate in international markets. Banks in these countries have also been 
encouraged by the Bank for International Settlements to extensively use their PMS in 
order to restrain the negative impact of political and social instability. Similarly, 
transnational institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and regional blocs also encourage banks to adopt practices that 
are consistent with international standards and practices. In considering the above 
factors, socio-cultural and political environments have a tendency of influencing 
performance measurement practices within banks.  
The three categories of macro-level factors discussed in this section, namely 
economic conditions, technological innovations, and socio-cultural and political 
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environments are considered to have a significant influence on banks’ functioning. As 
a result, banks generally become more competitive, resilient to technological 
innovations and associated service capabilities, and responsive to socio-cultural and 
political needs in order to secure their survival and legitimacy. Such requirements 
have significant implications for PMSs within banks. Nevertheless, organisational 
responses to macro-level influences are often not spontaneous. The direction and the 
nature of responses to the influence of the macro-level factors could result from three 
types of pressures (coercive, mimetic and normative) which are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
4. INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES FOR CHANGE 
 
Institutional theory suggests institutional pressures make organisations adapt in order 
to gain legitimacy (Covaleski & Dirsmith 1988). Pressures on banks to introduce 
change could occur in three forms namely coercive, mimetic and normative. This 
section discusses the way in which these pressures cause banks to respond to the 
macro-level factors discussed in the previous section. 
 
Coercive Pressure 
 
Institutional theory suggests that some institutional fields contain powerful 
environmental agents who impose structural forms or practices on subordinate 
organisational units (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 1991). Coercive pressures to change 
performance measurement practices could eventuate from other organisations upon 
which a particular organisation is dependent (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). For 
instance, in relation to the banking sector, prior research highlights the coercive 
influence exerted on organisations or on their behaviour through the central bank’s 
regulatory control and financial regulations (Hoque & Hopper 1994, 1997; Hussain 
2003).   
 
Central Bank’s Regulatory Control  
 
Banks are required to function within the regulations and guidelines of central banks, 
such as prudential regulations and Basel Agreements. The Basel Accord II describes a 
more comprehensive measure and a minimum standard for capital adequacy that 
supervisory authorities are required to implement through rule-making and adoption 
procedures. It seeks to improve the existing rules by aligning regulatory capital 
requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face. In addition, the 
Basel Accord II was intended to promote a more forward-looking approach to capital 
supervision, one that encourages banks to identify the risks they may face today and 
in the future, and to develop or improve their ability to manage those risks. In order to 
comply with Basel Accord II many central banks introduced the CAMELS and CAEL 
frameworks to evaluate banks’ performance (Asian Development Bank 2002; Hilbers, 
Krueger & Moretti 2000; Lall 2009). The failure to comply with the central bank’s 
regulations and guidelines attracts financial penalties or cancellation of a banking 
license. Banks are, therefore, required to improve their performance measurement as 
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well as internal control and risk measurement practices to be in accordance with the 
central banks’ and Basel standards. The pressure to improve performance 
measurement will be far greater in the next few years after the implementation of 
Basel Accord III at the end of 2012. According to the new regulations under Basel 
Accord III banks will be required to: maintain higher tier-1 and tier-2 risk-weighted 
capital ratio; use a leverage ratio as a safety net: maintain higher liquidity: use higher 
risk-weightings for trading assets of the banks; and exclude most of the off-balance 
sheet exposures from capital (Lall 2009; Wignall & Atkinson 2010).   
 
Financial Legislation 
 
Accounting bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) in the 
US and the international Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in the UK prescribe 
accounting standards, which in turn impact on the accounting systems upon which 
PMSs rely. Central banks require banks to follow the accounting standards and 
International Statements of Auditing (ISAs) and Audit Codes issued by the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFACs). The Basel Accord II requires that 
banks implement a progressive adoption of risk evaluation techniques. This has 
forced banks to transform their existing systems and procedures to accommodate the 
financial information requirements stipulated in the Basel Accord. Most of these 
changes have resulted in improvements in the disclosure of financial information 
arising from the reformulation of accounting rules for entries and reporting. These 
reformulations were designed to improve the informational quality of statements so 
that they accurately represented the true performance of the bank. The Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (2002) introduced in response to a series of corporate scandals in the US, 
requires organisations, in particular banks, to identify, assess and test the 
effectiveness of their key management controls and monitoring within the business to 
ensure greater accountability, transparency, and compliance with laws and regulations 
(Merchant & Van der Stede 2007).  
 
Mimetic Pressures 
 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argue that in an uncertain environment, organisations will 
imitate others in determining appropriate behaviour. Patterning their own operational 
or decision making systems on the systems used by industry leaders is seen as a 
means of reducing uncertainty and risk, and enhancing legitimacy (DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983; Greve 2000). Banks that lack the ability to implement and utilise their 
own PMSs tend to copy publicly accredited best practice PMSs from other successful 
banks, or from manufacturing organisations (Fligstein 1985; O’Neill, Pouder & 
Buchholtz 1998). This tendency of modeling practices of successful organisations 
occurs from a desire to gain legitimacy from their operating environment, although 
the relationship of PMSs with strategy and performance can still be absent. Large and 
high performing banks serve as strong role models for other banking institutions 
(McKendrick 1995). Anecdotal evidence suggests that mimetic behaviour occurs 
through a number of formal and informal avenues. For example, by recruiting 
professional and well trained employees of other banks and using them to develop 
Munir , Perera & Baird: An Analytical Framework to Examine Changes 
105 
 
similar systems they had used in the past. Hence when macro-level factors require 
banks to change their PMSs, in order to gain legitimacy and to signal to stakeholders 
their intention to improve efficiency, in certain situations banks would copy best 
practices in the industry.  
 
Normative Pressures 
 
According to DiMaggio & Powell (1991) normative pressure stems primarily from 
pressures from professionals. Professionalism refers to the collective struggle of 
members of an occupation, shared educational and professional experience, and 
infrastructure that establish norms of behaviour reflected in the management who 
make up institutions (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). In the banking sector, credit rating 
agencies, bankers’ professional associations, and banks’ training institutions reinforce 
normative expectations and impose standards, rules and values on banks.  Normative 
pressures can be exerted by professionals, top management and the organisational 
culture prevailing in a bank.  
 
Professionals 
 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) identify professionals as having the most dominant 
influence on organisational practices. Professional networks such as associations of 
accountants are known as an important source of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 
1991; Scapens 1994). In studying management control practices, Scapens (1994) 
regarded the influence of managers as an important factor in the adoption of new 
management practices. Hussain & Hoque (2002, p167) also acknowledge that “the 
experience of professionals such as managers may also influence the design and use 
of a performance measurement system”. Thus, professionals in a banking context, 
including bankers associations and bankers’ training institutions such as the Institute 
of International Bankers and the World Bank’s Economic Development Institute, 
could have an influence on the PMSs that are used within banks.  
 
Top management  
 
Granlund & Lukka (1998) and Scott (1987) argue that top management often creates 
cultural forms consistent with their own aims and beliefs. These, in turn, influence 
organisational practices and systems, including PMSs. The existing literature suggests 
that board members and chief financial officers can influence changes in PMSs. For 
instance, Cobb et al. (1995) explicitly state that such individuals within banks are 
generally considered as significant change agents. Cobb et al. (1995) also found top 
management played a dual role in the bank’s change process; on the one hand top 
management was the catalyst which initiated management accounting change 
processes, and on the other hand their leadership ability was found to be necessary to 
overcome barriers. Since PMSs are part of management accounting systems, top 
management and the power of strong individuals are recognised as factors that affect 
PMSs change as well.  
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Corporate Culture 
 
Corporate culture, which refers to the combined beliefs, values, ethics, procedures, 
and atmosphere of an organisation (Pettigrew 1979), could influence the opinion of 
employees about work practices, commitment, respect for managers and attitudes 
towards providing service to the customer. The tradition of a particular industry and 
leadership within an organisation could strongly affect the culture of an organisation 
(Pettigrew 1979). For example, banks and bankers have a risk-averse nature, therefore 
they choose systems and procedures which minimise overall organisational risk. 
Hence, the manner in which a bank is managed is likely to be influenced by the 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of the employees towards adopting and using a 
particular procedure and system. If employees resist a particular change based on the 
corporate culture prevailing in the bank, it may lead to conflicts, negotiations and/or 
compromise.  
The Basel Committee on banking supervision has also strongly emphasised 
that a bank’s framework for managing operational risk must include the bank’s 
appetite and tolerance for operational risk. The extent to which this is done is mainly 
contingent on a bank’s corporate culture (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2004, p167). Corporate culture, therefore, seems to have a tendency to influence 
organisational systems in general and PMSs in particular.  
 
5. STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO CHANGE EFFORTS 
 
There is ample evidence in the literature that suggests organisations do not always 
passively conform to changes, and that their responses to change vary. Drawing on 
institutional theory and the resource dependence perspective10, Oliver (1991) 
identified different strategic responses and tactics which organisations use in response 
to the institutional pressures for conformity. More specifically, Oliver (1991) 
proposed a typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures which shows that 
strategic responses to institutional pressures vary with the degree of resistance exerted 
by the organisation (See Table 1).  
As shown in Table 1, at times, banks would passively respond (i.e., 
acquiescence strategy) to change efforts, and such response may take different forms 
varying from unconscious habit-like adherence to rules or values to conscious 
compliance to norms, values or institutional requirements (Oliver 1991, p152). Such 
acquiescence is a strategic response that concurs with the idea of mimetic 
isomorphism. For example, most small local/domestic banks are likely to imitate the 
practices of major banks and foreign banks.   
Alternatively, banks may take more active responses to institutional 
pressures (i.e. compromise strategy). Where inconsistencies exist between 
institutional expectations and objectives of the bank, banks are likely to apply 
balancing tactics (i.e. attempt to achieve parity among or between multiple 
                                                 
10 The resource dependence perspective views an organisational environment as a bundle of resources 
which an organisation seeks to mobilise to reach its goals. In doing so, it exercises active choice of 
behaviour (Oliver 1991, p147). 
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stakeholders and internal interest), or pacifying tactics (i.e. monitoring a minor level 
of resistance to institutional pressure), or bargaining tactics (Oliver 1991, p153). Such 
responses are likely to arise particularly in relation to banks operating internationally. 
Bank branches located overseas might face a situation where the host banking 
sector’s objectives are in dissonance with the organisational objective of the bank. 
For example, risk management practices, central bank’s capital adequacy and 
liquidity requirements, and prudential regulations vary from country to country.  
In some situations, banks may use an “avoidance” strategy in order to 
preclude the necessity of conformity (Oliver 1991, p154). To achieve this purpose 
they may use a number of tactics. For instance, concealment tactics which involve 
disguising non-conformity behind a façade of acquiescence, or buffering tactics 
which involve attempts to reduce the extent to which it is externally inspected, 
scrutinised or evaluated by partially detaching or decoupling its technical activities 
from external contact (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Scott 1987). A more dramatic 
avoidance response is ‘escape’, where a bank decides to exit the domain within which 
pressure is exerted, or significantly alter its own goals, activities or domain to avoid 
the necessity of conformity altogether (Oliver 1991). The literature provides evidence 
of banks operating overseas who have exited (escaped) or buffered themselves from 
the host banking sector due to an uncertain economic, financial and political 
environment. For example, in the late 1990s the Bank of America, J.P. Morgan and 
the Credit Agricole Indosuez banks pulled out of their operations in most of the East 
Asian countries (Fuller 1999).    
 
Table 1:   A continuum of strategic responses to institutional pressures 
 
 
Strategies Tactics Examples 
Acquiescence Habit 
Imitate 
Comply 
Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms  
Mimicking institutional models 
Obeying rules and accepting norms 
Compromise Balance 
Pacify 
Bargain 
Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents 
Placating and accommodating institutional elements 
Negotiating with institutional stakeholders 
Avoid Conceal 
Buffer 
Escape 
Disguising nonconformity 
Loosening institutional attachments 
Changing goals, activities, or domains 
Defy Dismiss 
Challenge 
Attack 
Ignoring explicit norms and values 
Contesting rules and requirements 
Assaulting the sources of institutional pressure 
Manipulate Co-opt 
Influence 
Control 
Importing influential constituents 
Shaping values and criteria 
Dominating institutional constituents and processes 
                                       Source: Oliver (1991, p 152) 
 
 
Alternatively, a bank would ignore institutional rules and values, which 
challenge the existing rules and requirements (i.e., “defiance” strategy). The most 
aggressive defiance tactic is attacking the institutional pressures and expectations 
(Oliver 1991, p156). Rather than partially refusing to follow the newly recommended 
procedures (i.e. avoidance strategy), banks may decide to actively challenges such 
procedures (i.e. defiance strategy).  Further, a bank would even focus on changing the 
content of the expectations themselves or the sources that seek to express or reinforce 
Low 
High 
Level of 
active 
resistance 
to 
institutional 
pressures 
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them (i.e. manipulation strategy). As a tactic, a bank may choose to co-opt the source 
of the pressure or direct more general influence tactics towards institutionalised 
values and beliefs, and the criteria of acceptable practices or performance. Banks also 
could apply controlling tactics whereby they exert efforts to establish power and 
dominance over those that are applying pressure on the banks (Oliver 1991, p157). 
For example, large banks tend to create cartels to lobby regulatory authorities to adopt 
certain practices that fit their needs.  
Oliver’s (1991) typology provides an appropriate conceptual basis for 
exploring the diversity of strategic responses that a bank may adopt in response to 
institutional pressures to change their systems such as PMSs.  
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework to analyse changes in PMSs 
within the banking sector, more specifically to examine the factors influencing 
changes in PMSs and the organisational responses to change efforts. Existing research 
provides only limited assistance to undertake such analysis particularly in relation to 
the banking sector. Lack of such research compromises the explanation and 
understanding of PMSs change in the banking sector. Such a research effort is even 
more crucial in the wake of the recent global financial crisis which has caused rapid 
changes in the banking environment. 
The framework proposed in this paper and depicted in Figure 1 incorporates 
the concept of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). In addition, the 
continuum of strategic responses to institutional pressures proposed by Oliver (1991) 
is used to increase the explanatory power of the framework, so that it allow a fuller 
understanding of the complexities of PMSs change phenomena within banks. The 
paper argues that the functioning of banks is subject to the influence of various 
macro-level factors (i.e. economic, technological, socio-cultural and political), and 
the resulting pressures which could take various forms (i.e. coercive, mimetic and 
normative) subsequently lead to the introduction of changes to PMSs. While banks 
may consider introducing certain changes to their PMSs because of the three forms of 
pressure discussed above, the change efforts may also be subject to direct pressure 
from certain powerful elements in the macro-level environment. Such influences may 
be exerted using informal avenues, and the nature and the extent of the recommended 
change could be the result of both formal (i.e. coercive, mimetic and normative 
pressures) and informal pressures (direct influence of macro-level elements). The 
paper argues that there is no universal way to manage the PMS change process, since 
both the institutional as well as macro-level environment play a significant role in the 
process of change in a PMS. 
The paper also acknowledges that banks’ responses to change efforts could 
vary between passive responses (i.e. acquiescence) to active responses (i.e. 
manipulation). It is important to view PMS change as a complex process, with 
unintended consequences and the potential to disrupt organisational life. Hence, those 
responsible for introducing change in the PMS need to consider how employees react 
to change in PMS.  
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The paper contributes in two ways. First, the framework developed in this 
paper could be used by managers and researchers to examine and understand changes 
in PMSs in banks which could also facilitate them in adopting and implementing 
performance measurement systems in an effective manner. Secondly, it makes a 
theoretical contribution by developing a framework to enable a systematic analysis of 
PMS change by drawing on two theoretical concepts, namely institutional 
isomorphism and strategic responses to change. These unique features distinguish the 
framework developed in this paper from previous approaches suggested within the 
management accounting literature (e.g. Burns & Scapens 2000; Greenwood & 
Hinings 1996; Hussain & Hoque 2002; Innes & Mitchell 1990; Kasurinen 2002; 
Waggoner et al. 1999). Other researchers may consider how they can adapt the 
framework to be applicable in other sectors.   
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